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Abstract
Quantum key distribution based on encoding in three dimensional systems in the presence of several
eavesdroppers is proposed. This extends the BB84 protocol in the presence of many eavesdroppers
where two-level quantum systems (qubits) are replaced by three-level systems (qutrits). We discuss
the scenarios involving two, three and four complementary bases. We derive the explicit form of Alice
and Bob mutual information and the information gained by each eavesdropper. In particular, we show
that, in the presence of only one eavesdropper, the protocol involving four bases is safer than the other
ones. However, for two eavesdroppers, the security is strongly dependent on the attack probabilities.
The effect of a large number of eavesdroppers is also investigated.
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1 Introduction
Inspired by Wiesner’s ideas [1], Bennett and Brassard proposed in 1984 [2] a new approach to
cryptography by developing a key distribution protocol , now known as BB84. Since then Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) constitutes one the most investigated concept in the quantum information
theory. QKD provides a scheme to ensure a secure communication between two legitimate parties
(usually called Alice and Bob) using quantum states that belong to non compatible bases. Quantum
mechanics ensures that in quantum cryptographic protocols, the presence of an eavesdropper (often
called Eve) in the communication channel can be detected through disturbances to the transmitted
message. In the BB84 protocol [2], Alice and Bob randomly choose between two complementary bases
and the information of each basis is encoded using the orthogonal states of a two dimensional quantum
system. This protocol was extended in different ways. The first extension was proposed in [3]-[4] by
adding an extra basis that is mutually unbiased compared to the other two in a two dimensional
system. Cryptographic schemes, extending the BB84 model, based on d level quantum systems with
M mutually unbiased bases were also developed. In this sense, a protocol using d = 4 states and
M = 2 bases was studied in [5] and the case of d = 3 states and M = 4 bases was presented in [6].
This provided a way to formulate a generalized quantum key distribution involving quantum systems
with arbitrary dimension d and using M mutually complementary bases [7]-[8].
The main task of quantum protocols, mentioned above as well as many others proposed in the
literature, is traditionally to provide secure communications against only one eavesdropper. Recently,
in [9], the authors discussed a scenario involving several eavesdroppers. This extends the BB84 protocol
to take into account the effects induced by many potential eavesdroppers. In this paper, we replace,
in the model introduced in [9], the two-level quantum systems (qubits) by optical biphoton qutrits.
At this stage, it is important to note that three level optical systems constitute promising objects of
modern quantum information and quantum cryptography. Indeed, the realization of optical qutrits
with light has been approached using the polarization states of two indistinguishable photons -a
biphoton [10] and their experimental manipulation was discussed in [11]. Also, quantum encoding
based on polarization states of a biphoton was examined in [12].
To investigate quantum key distribution based on a three level optical system, we shall first develop,
in the second section, a method to construct the phase states of a biphoton-system and we define the
discrete operations generating four mutually unbiased bases from which Alice can choose to encode
her message. A second facet of this work concerns the mutual information between Alice and Bob and
the information intercepted by the eavesdroppers which employ the intercept-resend strategy. The
explicit expressions of mutual informations as well as quantum errors are given, in the third section, in
terms of the numberN of eavesdroppers, the attack probabilities and the numberM of complementary
bases used by the sender to encode her message. In the last section, analysis of the security of the
model in the particular cases of N = 1 and N = 2 are presented. We also discuss the case where
the N eavesdroppers are collaborating (all intercept the sent message with identical probabilities).
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Concluding remarks close this paper.
2 Qutrits, Phase states and mutually unbiased bases
2.1 Phase states
The biphoton qutrits are considered as superpositions of the three dimensional Fock space correspond-
ing to the three possibilities of distributing two indistinguishable photons in two polarization modes
horizontal (h) and vertical (v). The Fock space of purely polarized biphoton states is defined by
F = {|nh, nv〉 , nh + nv = 2} (1)
where |nh, nv〉 is a Fock representation of nh (nv) horizontally (vertically) polarized photons. They
are given by
|nh, nv〉 =
(a+h )
nh
√
nh!
(a+h )
nv
√
nv!
|00〉. (2)
The vector |0, 0〉 is the vacuum state and the objects a+h and a+v are the creation operators of photons
with horizontal and vertical polarizations (with given equal frequencies and given identical propagation
directions). The annihilation operators are defined as usual (a−h = (a
+
h )
†, a−v = (a
+
v )
†).
To introduce the phase states, we first define the unitary phase operator as in [13]
E = |2, 0〉〈0, 2| + |1, 1〉〈2, 0| + |0, 2〉〈1, 1|. (3)
It is unitary. To find the phase states corresponding to this three level system, let us consider the
eigenvalue equation
E|z〉 = z|z〉, z ∈ C. (4)
By expanding the state |z〉 as a linear combination of the vector states of F , it is easy to see that the
eigenvalue z is given by
z = qm = exp
(
i
2pim
3
)
with m = 0, 1, 2, (5)
and the normalized eigenstates of the operator E (the phase states) rewrite
|m〉 = 1√
3
(|0, 2〉 + qm|1, 1〉 + q2m|2, 0〉). (6)
It follows that the states |m〉 satisfy
E|m〉 = eiθm |m〉 θm = 2pim
3
, (7)
which shows that they are indeed phase states and E is a unitary phase operator. The phase states
are orthonormal (〈m′|m〉 = δm′,m). Then, Alice encodes her message in the computational basis
generating the Fock space F or in the phase states basis {|m〉 , m = 0, 1, 2}. It is important to note
that Alice can use two others bases which can be generated from the phase states as shown in what
follows.
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2.2 Mutually unbiased bases
Recall that two d-dimensional bases are said to be unbiased if and only if the modulus of the inner
product of any vector of one basis with any vector of the other one is equal to 1/
√
d [14]-[15]. The
number M of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) is such that M ≤ d + 1. The maximum number
M = d + 1 can be achieved when d is prime or a power of a prime [15]. Construction of MUBs
associated with finite dimensional Hilbert space was considered via different methods as for instance
ones based on discrete Fourier analysis over Galois fields and Galois rings, generalized Pauli matrices,
angular momentum theory, etc ( for a recent review and other methods of MUBs construction see [16]).
Accordingly, the three level optical system we are considering, has four mutually unbiased bases. The
first basis is the computational basis B3 := {|2, 0〉 , |1, 1〉 , |0, 2〉} and the second one is generated by
the phase states (6). Indeed, it is easy to check that the states (6) are unbiased to the computational
basis . The two other remaining mutually unbiased bases can be generated as follows. We introduce
the time evolution operator U(t) defined by
U(t)|nh, nv〉 = eia
+
h
a−
h
a−v a
+
v t|nh, nv〉 (8)
in term of vertical and horizontal ladder operators. The operator U(t) generates MUBs when acting
on the phase states (6). Indeed, for the discrete values
t := tp =
ppi
3
with p = 0, 1, 2,
the states (6) transform as
U(tp)|m〉 := |p,m〉 = 1√
3
(|0, 2〉 + qm+p|1, 1〉 + q2m+p|2, 0〉). (9)
Notice that for p = 0, the states |0,m〉 coincide with phase states (6) (|0,m〉 ≡ |m〉). It is simply verified
that the computational basis B3 and the bases Bp = {|p,m〉} (p = 0, 1, 2) are mutually unbiased. To
close this section, it is important to note that the operator U(tp) is related to the quadratic discrete
Fourier transform [16] and coincides with the so-called tritter [17] which is a generalization, in three
dimensional case, of the 2× 2 unitary operation characterizing a 50-50 beam splitter.
3 Eavesdropping strategy and mutual informations
As mentioned above, quantum key distribution in the presence of several eavesdroppers was developed
in [9]. This scenario extends the BB84 protocol by investigating the effect of several eavesdropper
intercept-resend attacks on the quantum error and mutual information between two legitimate parties.
It was shown that the secured-unsecured transition depends strongly on the number of eavesdroppers
and their probabilities of intercepting attacks. In this section, we investigate the effect of several
eavesdroppers on the quantum cryptographic scheme using biphoton qutrits.
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3.1 Eavesdropping strategy: the Model
Following the idea discussed by Bourenanne et al [7], we consider a protocol with M (2 ≤ M ≤ 4)
mutually complementary bases and 3 orthogonal states in each base. We shall assume that this
protocol is under attack by an arbitrary number N of eavesdroppers E1 , E2 , ..., EN . Within this
protocol, Alice first selects randomly one of the M bases in which she wants to encode her state
and second decides which of the 3 optical states (|0, 2〉, |1, 1〉 or |2, 0〉) to send. In other words, she
sends to Bob random states in which the number of horizontally polarized photons is 0, 1, 2 with
equal probability of 1/3. Bob measures each symbol sent by selecting at random between the M
bases. Hence, the mutual information between Alice and Bob can be described by a joint probability
P (xA, xB). The random variables xA = 0, 1, 2 and xB = 0, 1, 2 represent the number of horizontally
polarized photons prepared by the sender (Alice) and the measurement results obtained by the receiver
(Bob). Between them a number N of eavesdropper Ei (i = 1, ..., N) are trying to intercept the sent
message. Each eavesdropper Ei intercepts, with probability ωi, the biphoton state emitted by the
eavesdropper Ei−1. He or she measures its number of photons horizontally polarized by selecting at
random, with probability 1/M , between the M MUBs and resends it, in its measured state, to the
eavesdropper Ei+1. At the place of the non measured biphoton polarization, with probability 1− ωi,
the eavesdropper Ei sends randomly 0, 1, 2, with equal probability 1/3, to the eavesdropper Ei+1. In
the same way, the eavesdropper Ei+1 intercepts, with probability ωi+1, the biphoton state emitted by
the eavesdropper Ei, measures its number of photons polarized horizontally by selecting at random,
with probability 1/M , between the M MUBs, and resends it in its measured state to the eavesdropper
Ei+2 and so on. We note that the eavesdropper E1 intercepts the state emitted by Alice and the
eavesdropper EN resends the biphoton to Bob.
Finally, in order to obtain a secret key, Alice and Bob use an authenticated public channel to
estimate the error rate and the maximal quantity of information obtained by the eavesdroppers.
However, if the error rate (called the error probability) is greater than a critical value (quantum error)
Alice and Bob begin another protocol to establish another secret key until the error rate becomes
smaller than the quantum error.
3.2 The mutual informations
To evaluate the mutual information between Alice and Bob and the amount of information gained by
the eavesdroppers, the relevant information is the Shannon information of the sifted symbols, i.e., the
symbols for which Alice and Bob have used the same bases. This information is measured in bits for
simplicity.
Let us denote by p(x) the prior probability for Alice to send the symbol x and p(x|y) is the posteriori
probability that is the conditional probability of the sending party having sent the symbol x and the
receiver (Bob or Eves) measured the result y. The mutual information is (see for instance [7])
IAY = log2 3−Hapost (10)
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where Y stands for B,E1, E2, · · · , EN and the quantity
Hapost = −
∑
y
p(y)
∑
x
p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) (11)
is the aposteriori entropy. Using the symmetry properties of the protocol, it is easy to check that
IAY = log2 3 +
2∑
nh=0
p(nh|0) log2 p(nh|0). (12)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob IAB and between Alice and the m-th eavesdropper
IAEm (m = 1, 2, · · · , N) are expressed in terms of the conditional probabilities which can be easily
evaluated in terms of the attack probabilities using the eavesdropping strategy discussed above.
Using the expression (12), we can hence obtain the mutual information between Alice and Bob
IAB = log2 3 + PAB(0|0) log2(PAB(0|0)) + [1− PAB(0|0)] log2
[
1− PAB(0|0)
2
]
, (13)
in term of the conditional probability PAB(0|0). Based on the assumptions defining the eavesdropping
strategy, one can show that this probability takes the following form
PAB(0|0) =
N∑
k=0
ak(N)Ωk(N) (14)
where the coefficients ak(N) are given by
ak(N) =
1
MN−k
[
1 +
M − 1
3
N−k−1∑
i=0
M i
]
, (15)
and the quantities Ωk(N) are expressed in term of eavesdroppers attack probabilities as
Ωk(N) = ω1ω2 · · ·ωN
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
[
1− ωi1
ωi1
1− ωi2
ωi2
· · · 1− ωik
ωik
]
(16)
for k 6= 0 and the indices ij take the values 1, · · · , N . For k = 0,
Ω0(N) = ω1ω2 · · ·ωN . (17)
Similarly, using equation (12), it is simple to show that the direct reconciliation information be-
tween Alice and the m-th eavesdropper is given by
IAEm = log2 3 + PAEm(0|0) log2(PAEm(0|0)) + [1− PAEm(0|0)] log2
[
1− PAEm(0|0)
2
]
, (18)
where
PAEm(0|0) =
1− ωm
3
+
m−1∑
k=0
ak(m)Ωk(m). (19)
The lost information between the honest parties Alice and Bob corresponds to the maximum
information intercepted by the entire eavesdroppers. This is given by
IAE = Max
(
IAE1 , IAE2 , · · · , IAEN−1 , IAEN
)
. (20)
6
The error rate or the error probability Perr is defined by
Perr =
∑
xA,xB
∣∣∣∣PAB(xA/xB)∣∣ωi=0 − PAB(xA/xB)
∣∣
ωi 6=0
∣∣∣∣. (21)
The quantum error Qerr is the value of the error probability Perr for which IAB = IAE . It follows
that for Perr < Qerr we have IAE < IAB , while for Perr > Qerr we have IAE > IAB .
4 Results and discussion
As illustration of the analysis developed in the previous section, we investigate in what follows the
security of the protocol based on optical qutrit states in the presence of several eavesdroppers, in some
particular cases.
4.1 One eavesdropper and mutual informations
In the situation where only one eavesdropper is trying to intercept the message sent by Alice (ω1 = ω),
the equation (14) gives
PAB(0|0) = 1
M
(
1 +
M − 1
3
)
ω + (1− ω). (22)
Similarly from equation (19), one obtains
PAE(0|0) = 1− ω
3
+
1
M
(
1 +
M − 1
3
)
ω. (23)
Reporting the conditional probabilities (22) and (23) in the equations (13) and (18), respectively,
one has the mutual information IAB and IAE . The behavior of IAB and IAE as function of the attack
probability ω are plotted in the figure 1.a.
FIG. 1.a: Mutual information IAB and IAE as a function of the attack probability ω for qubits and
qutrits.
As expected, the mutual information between Alice and Bob and the amount of information inter-
cepted by Eve coincide for ω = 1. In figure 1.a, we also plotted the mutual information IAB and IAE
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when the sender uses a two dimensional system with two or three mutually unbiased bases to encode
her message. The explicit expressions of IAB and IAE are given in the appendix. They are computed
similarly to ones derived in the previous section for a three level system. This helps us to compare the
amount of mutual information when Alice uses qubits or qutrits as it shown in the figure 1.a. Note
that the obtained mutual information for d = 2 and M = 2 are in agreement with the results derived
in [9].
To examine the security of the protocol, we studied the mutual information between the legitimate
parties Alice and Bob IAB and lost information IAE as function of the error probability (Figure 1.b).
FIG. 1.b: Mutual information IAB and IAE as a function of quantum error Qerr for qubits and qutrits.
In this figure, we give the behavior of IAB and IAE for d = 3 when Alice chooses to encode her
message using two, three or four complementary bases in the presence of only one eavesdropper. We
evaluate the quantum error for each case. The results are summarized in table 1. In figure 1.b, we
also present the information IAB and IAE for qubits (d = 2) as a function of error probability. This is
useful in order to compare our results with ones obtained within the BB84 protocol and the protocol
involving qubits with six states (M = 3) ( see [3] and [4]). In this particular case, we evaluate the
quantum error for M = 2 and M = 3. The results are given in table 1. It is clear from the figure as
well as the table 1 that the protocol using (d = 2) with (M = 3) appears to provide better security.
It is also important to stress that the quantum error in the case d = 3 and M = 4 provides the
same quantum error as in the BB84 protocol. This shows that in a protocol involving three level
systems, Alice should use four mutually unbiased bases to ensure the security of her sent information.
It must be noticed that for d fixed, the quantum error increases with increasing values of the number
of mutually unbiased bases M . In this respect, Alice must encode her message using all the available
mutually unbiased bases to minimize the eavesdropping effects.
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M 2 3 4
d = 3 0.167 0.222 0.250
d = 2 0.25 0.335
Table 1: Quantum error for two and three level systems.
4.2 Two eavesdroppers and mutual information
Now, we consider the situation where two eavesdroppers E1 and E2 attack with probabilities ω1 and
ω2, respectively. In this case, the equation (14) takes the simple form
PAB(0|0) = 1
M2
(
1+
M2 − 1
3
)
ω1ω2+
1
M
(
1+
M − 1
3
)(
ω1(1−ω2)+(1−ω1)ω2
)
+(1−ω1)(1−ω2). (24)
Similarly, from equations (19), one has
PAE1(0|0) =
1− ω1
3
+
1
M2
(
1 +
M2 − 1
3
)
ω1ω2, (25)
and
PAE2(0|0) =
1− ω2
3
+
1
M2
(
1 +
M2 − 1
3
)
ω1ω2 +
1
M
(
1 +
M − 1
3
)(
(1− ω1)ω2
)
. (26)
Substituting (24) into (13), one gets the mutual information IAB between Alice and Bob. The condi-
tional probabilities (25) and (26) together with the equations (18) and (20) give the lost information
to the eavesdropper, IAE. The figure 2.a represents the mutual information IAB and IAE (for d = 3
and M = 2) as function of the attack probability ω1 of the first eavesdropper for different values of
the attack probability of the second eavesdropper.
FIG. 2.a: Mutual information IAB and IAE as a function of the attack probability ω1 for different values
of ω2.
It clear that IAB and IAE depend strongly on the values ω1 and ω2 and the mutual information
between the legitimate parties decreases as ω1 and ω2 increase. The limiting case ω2 = 0 corresponds
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to the protocol involving only one eavesdropper. In this case, the amount of information gained by
the eavesdropper increases to intercept the information exchanged by Alice and Bob at ω1 = 1. But,
when ω2 6= 0, the information intercepted by the eavesdroppers intersect IAB for ω1tr ≃ 0.92 when
ω2 = 0.25 and for ω1tr ≃ 0.76 when ω2 = 0.75. Hence, for ω1 > ω1tr, the amount of information lost
becomes greater that one exchanged between Alice and Bob and occurs at the transition from the
secured to unsecured phase.
To understand the security of quantum key distribution based on qutrits in presence of two eaves-
droppers, we studied the transition between the secured and unsecured phases. We note that in the
secured phase, the error probability is smaller than the quantum error, while in the no secured phase
the error probability is greater than the quantum error. At the transition line, the error probability
coincides with the quantum error. Phase diagram, in the space parameter (ω1, ω2), is presented in the
figure 2.b. This shows the transition line between secured and no secured phases. In contrast to the
case of the protocol with one eavesdropper for which the secured-unsecured transition occurs at an
intercept probability ω1 = 1, the region of secured phase depends on both intercept probability rates
ω1 and ω2. We consider the situations where Alice uses two, three and four mutually bases.
From figure 2.b, it is easily seen that for 0 < ω1 < 0.55, the line transition between the secured
and unsecured phase is ω2-independent. It is also independent of the number of mutually independent
bases M used by Alice. This changes drastically when the probability attack of the eavesdropper
E1 becomes grater than 0.55. In this case, the transition depends strongly on the values of attacks
probability of the second eavesdropper as well as the mutually unbiased bases M . The transition
probability, at the transition line, increases with decreasing ω2
FIG. 2.b: The (ω1, ω2) phase diagram for qutrits.
To clarify the behavior of the transition from the secured to unsecured phase for 0.55 ≤ ω1 ≤ 1,
we give the figure 2.c where the line transition is represented for M = 2,M = 3 and M = 4. From
this figure, one can see that for 0.55 < ω1 < 0.67, the protocol involving M = 4 complementary bases
gives less security than the two others using two and three bases. This situation becomes different in
the region 0.67 < ω1 < 0.86; Indeed, in this case the model with M = 3 provides less security. Finally,
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for ω1 > 0.86, when Alice uses only two complementary bases, the area of secured phase is reduced in
comparison to ones corresponding to the secured phases obtained with M = 3 and M = 4.
FIG. 2.c: The (ω1, ω2) phase diagram for 0.55 ≤ ω1 ≤ 1.
4.3 Many eavesdroppers
Now, we shall discuss the situation where the eavesdroppers communicate between them and try to
intercept the same state with identical probability ωi = ω for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . In this case, the equation
(14) takes the simple form
PAB(0/0) =
1
3
+
2
3
[
1 +
ω
M
(1−M)
]N
, (27)
and the equation (19) gives
PAEm(0/0) =
1
3
+
2
3
ω
M
[
1 +
ω
M
(1−M)
]m−1
. (28)
The (ω,N)-phase diagram (Figure 3.a) shows the secured-unsecured transition when the N eaves-
droppers are collaborating and attack with the same probability ω.
FIG. 3a: The (ω,N)-phase diagram.
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The security of the protocol decreases when N increases. Moreover, in the region (0.1 ≤ ω ≤
1, 0 ≤ N ≤ 50), the security of the protocol is completely independent of the number M of mutually
unbiased bases used by the sender. However, for N ≥ 50 and 0 ≤ ω ≤ 0.1 (see figure 3.b), more
security is provided by the protocol involving two complementary bases (i.e., M = 2).
FIG. 3b: The (ω,N)-phase diagram.
5 Concluding remarks
We have considered quantum cryptographic scheme where bi-photon qutrits are used to encode the
information. Using the Pegg-Barnett phase operator, we defined the four mutually unbiased bases
of this three level system. This is mainly based on the phase states approach. To compare the
qutrits based cryptographic protocols with their qubits based counterpart, we also investigated the
bi-dimensional quantum systems when the sender uses two or three bases in the presence of many
eavesdroppers. In the situation where only one eavesdropper is involved, for a two level quantum
system, the protocol based on three complementary bases is safer than the BB84 one which uses two
bases only. We have shown that when Alice and Bob exchange information using qutrits, the safer
scenario corresponds to one using four mutually unbiased bases. It follows that for d = 2 as well as
d = 3, to ensure the security of the sent information, Alice should encode her message using all the
available complementary bases of the Hilbert space of the quantum system under consideration. It
is important to note that the quantum error for the scheme involving four mutually unbiased bases
coincides with the one obtained in BB84 protocol. It seems that for higher dimensional quantum
systems, the maximal security is reached when the sender uses all available complementary bases.
These results change drastically when more than one eavesdropper attempt to intercept the information
exchanged between the legitimate parties. Indeed, the secured-unsecured transition for qutrits is
strongly dependent on the attack probabilities ω1 and ω2. In this case many scenarios are possible
and there is a concurrence between the protocols involving two, three or four mutually unbiased
bases. Finally, we have shown that the number of the eavesdroppers reduces the area of secured phase
and the protocol becomes less secure. In particular, we examined the case where a large number of
collaborating eavesdroppers are trying to intercept the information with equal probability ω. This
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shows clearly that the number of eavesdroppers is very important in dealing with the security of any
quantum cryptographic key distribution protocol .
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Appendix
It is well known that for a two dimensional quantum system, there is three maximally unbiased
bases from which Alice can choose M = 2 or M = 3 bases to encode her message. Similarly to the
qutrits case discussed above and using the same assumptions, the mutual information between Alice
and Bob, in presence of one eavesdropper only, can be found as
IAB = 1 + PAB(0|0) log2(PAB(0|0)) + [1− PAB(0|0)] log2
[
1− PAB(0|0)
2
]
,
where
PAB(0|0) = 1− ω
2
M − 1
M
.
The intercepted information by the eavesdropper is
IAE(0|0) = 1 + PAE(0|0) log2(PAE(0|0)) + [1− PAE(0|0)] log2
[
1− PAE(0|0)
2
]
,
where
PAE =
1
2
(
1 +
ω
M
)
.
For two eavesdroppers E1 and E2, trying to intercept the sent information with probabilities ω1 and
ω2, the conditional probabilities are given by
PAB(0|0) = 1− M − 1
2M
(ω1 + ω2) +
(M − 1)2
2M2
ω1ω2,
PAE1(0|0) =
1
2
[
1− ω1(1− ω2) + ω1ω2
M2
]
,
and
PAE2(0|0) =
1
2
[
1 +
ω2
M
− M − 1
M2
ω1ω2
]
from which one can evaluate the mutual informations IAB , IAE1 and IAE2 .
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